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Abstract. This study aims to develop a standard method for measuring the rent of an 
individual enterprise from its financial statement data and to analyze the relationship 
between rents of companies and their political and R&D expenditures. This method will 
allow for the decomposition of various causes that yield rents by regression analyses. This 
study set the equation of the first-order condition of profit maximization as a function of the 
capital amount, satisfying both short-term and long-term optimal conditions, and obtained 
the mark-up rate that can realize the production level in monopolistic equilibrium as a 
competitive equilibrium. The average rents for 29 industries in Japan were calculated using 
a linear algebraic method from 30 years’ time-series financial statement data. Moreover, 
this study also managed to substitute production factors for pseudo-production factors 
applicable to global companies whose breakdown of manufacturing and sales costs are 
usually not disclosed. These rents are regressed by political and R&D expenditures of each 
industry. In several models, political expenditure has a significant relationship with rent, 
although R&D expenditure does not. 
Keywords. Rent, Political expenditure, Financial statement, R&D expenditure, Japanese 
industries. 
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1. Introduction 
ree trade and free capital movement are considered more efficient. However, 
trade liberalization does not always improve efficiency, such as incases 
involving market failure. When free trade accompanies environmental 
deterioration, for example, if trade liberalization is done without internalizing 
environmental externality, there is a decline in social welfare. Nevertheless, the 
reduction of tariff and elimination of non-tariff barriers have been rapidly 
implemented under insufficient domestic environmental policies. A political 
scientist, Gilligan (1997), explained that changes in the political power balance 
between importing industries and exporting industries has caused the acceleration 
of free trade in the United States since before World War II. As Krueger (1974) 
asserted, if enterprises secure more rent through their political behavior, they will 
compete to access the political process. In fact, according to Drutman (2015), the 
total expenditure for lobbying in 2012 amounted to more than three billion dollars 
in the United States, and 78 percent of this consisted of business-related lobbying. 
If it is rational for enterprises to allocate some part of their rent to their political 
activity to get more rent, not only their economic variables but also their political 
behaviors should endogenize into an economic model. 
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The purpose of this study is to construct a standard method to measure the rent 
of corporations and especially to analyze the relationship between their rent and 
political behavior. This is partly because rent can be an investment resource for 
their political behaviors like lobbying. It also examines the relationship between 
corporations’ rent and their R&D investment, which is said to enhance profitability 
and yield Schumpeter rent in comparison.1 
      
2. Objectives of the study 
2.1. Rent and Political Expenditure 
This paper provides a briefover view of political expenditure and rent 
measurement and demonstrates why the measurement of real rent for each 
company is important.  
Until the 1960s, deadweight losses were considered social costs because of 
monopoly. Harberger (1954) and Schwartzman (1960) made quantitative 
estimations of deadweight losses. However, Tullock (1967) argued that not only 
deadweight loss but also the excess profit brought to companies because of entry 
barriers and tariffs (i.e., rent) are a social cost. Thereafter, many empirical studies 
of rent by governmental regulations have been conducted, as reviewed by Posner 
(1975). More recently, for example, Tarr (1994) calculated rent by the regulated 
price of bicycles and television before and after socialism in Poland. Salhofer, 
Hofreither, & Sinabell (2000) evaluated the rent for agricultural promotion 
measures in Austria. Jarvis (2005) regarded an increase in export earnings because 
of export quota to Brazilian coffee as rent. They have been estimated generally by 
measuring producer surplus at the industrial level and by aggregated variables. 
However, it is a rather rough basis for analyzing the relationship between 
companies and rents, and actual measures such as taxation and surrogacy for 
individual companies. 
In another field, studies focusing on the impact on macroeconomic 
performances by rent-seeking activities have appeared. There is empirical evidence 
suggesting that rent-seeking or corruption among companies is negative for 
economic growth. For example, Mauro (1995) analyzed 68 countries using 
indicators of bureaucratic organization efficiency, corruption, judicial system 
efficiency, and political stability, and found that GDP is highlycorrelatedwith 
bureaucratic efficiency and low corruption. Cole & Chawdhry (2002) showed that 
rent-seeking activities have a negative impact on state economic growth through a 
panel data analysis of US states. However, empirical studieshave also suggested 
that rent-seeking or corruption has positive effectson economic growth. Khan & 
Sundaram (2000) sometimes found a positive relationship between rent seeking 
and economic development in several Asian countries in their case studies. 
Ayyagari, Demirgüҫ-Kunt, & Maksimovic (2014) concluded that innovating firms 
are more likely to pay bribes to government officials than firms that do not 
innovate by the data of World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 
Depending on countries, industries, and periods, a simple result about the 
relationship between rent and growth cannot be concluded; however, it can be 
asserted that more specific data and indicators can yield more precise results. 
Drutman (2015) conducted a comprehensive analysis of corporate political 
expenditure in the United States. Drutman conducted an empirical analysis of what 
kind of variable the size of the lobbying of companies correlates to. It should be 
noted that the size of lobbying has a significant positive correlation with a 
company’s sales value and does not have a significant relationship with the 
company’s profit.  
If the rent amount of each company can be precisely specified, it will be 
possible tofind more direct and quantitative results of the relationship between rent 
and corporate political expenditure. Furthermore, multivariate regression analyses 
of rent amounts with various variables will enable the decomposition of causes 
yielding rents. Subsequently, it may be possible, for example, to find a proper 
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corporate tax rate or the government may find appropriate support measures for 
improving productivity of firms. 
This study developed a method to identify the rent of each company and to 
directly analyze the relationship between rent and political expenditure. This will 
make it easier and clearer to analyze the relationship between corporate political 
activities and the economy. 
 
2.2. Monopoly and Monopsony Rent 
In this study, a method to measure monopoly and monopsony rent will be 
applied as the method for measuring the inclusive rent of an enterprise using 
financial statements of enterprises. Section 3 will explain this further. This section 
discusses the review and scope of monopoly and monopsony rent. 
To measure the amount of monopoly and monopsony rent, the measurement of 
the degree of monopoly and monopsony is useful. Once the degree of monopoly is 
obtained, the amount of monopoly rent is calculated from monopoly price and 
quantity in the equilibrium. Let us follow the process of the progress of the degree 
of monopoly and monopsony. 
Since the 1970s, studies applying the new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO) method have been conducted. This method measures the degree of 
monopoly and monopsony on an industrial level. Under this method, the general 
necessary profit-maximization condition for a monopolistic firm is considered to be 
 
p  1 +
1
𝛿
 = 𝑀𝐶                                                   (1) 
 
where p is the demand price of the product (and is a function of y, the quantity of 
the product demanded at the industrial level), MC is the marginal cost of 
production, and δ is the elasticity of demand with respect to the product price, 
defined by 
 
δ=
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑝
𝑦
𝑝
                                                           (2) 
 
In the case of oligopoly, the necessary condition for the ith firm is 
 
p(1+
𝜃
𝛿
) = 𝑀𝐶𝑖                                                     (3) 
 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑖  is the marginal cost faced by the i
th firm, and θ is the conjectural 
elasticity of total industry output with respect to the output of the ith firm, defined 
by 
 
θ =  
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝑦𝑖
𝑦
𝑦𝑖
                                                       (4) 
 
where 𝑦𝑖  is the quantity produced by the i
th firm, and y =   𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖 .  
In the monopoly model, if δ equals zero, then the product market is competitive; 
thus, the null hypothesis to test is δ=0. In the oligopoly model, the focus is on the 
conjectural elasticity, θ. If θ equals zero, a supply increase by the ith firm has no 
effect on the total industry-wide amount of the product produced; thus, the market 
can be seen as competitive. When θ equals 1, the market is a complete monopoly 
for the ith firm. The NEIO approach is generally used to estimate conjectural 
elasticity in oligopoly models: that is, the degree of oligopoly. 
The pioneering works in this field are Iwata (1974) and Gollop & Roberts 
(1979), with the empirical study of Appelbaum (1982) providing the standard for 
modelling. This approach uses an equation system consisting of an inverse demand 
function for the product, the (shadow) profit-maximization condition of the 
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behavioral profit function, and the input demand functions developed by estimating 
a generalized Leontief cost function to obtain a value of θ. Subsequently, a 
considerable body of empirical analysis using this technique has appeared.  
The source of the excess profits earned under oligopoly is considered to be a 
discrepancy between market prices and the marginal revenues of the oligopolistic 
firms. This can be estimated by multiplying the inverse price elasticity of demand 
for the product by the conjectural elasticity. Similarly, the differences between the 
marginal factor cost and market price of the factor give the firm’s excess profit, 
which can be estimated on the basis of the inverse price elasticity of factor supply 
multiplied by the conjectural elasticity.  
Empirical studies seeking to estimate the degree of oligopsony/monopsony in 
the factor market using simultaneous equation systems have been undertaken since 
the late 1980s.  
In the late 1980s, Schroeter (1988) and Azzam & Pagoulatos (1990) analyzed 
the degree of oligopoly and oligopsony simultaneously by applying the Appelbaum 
(1982) technique to not only the output market but also the input market; thus, the 
simultaneous equation system also included an inverse input supply function. In 
recent years, many additional studies in this vein have emerged, such as Bouras & 
Engle (2007) and Mei & Sun (2008). Atkinson & Kerkvliet (1989) simultaneously 
analyzed monopoly and monopsony pricing of electric utility companies. 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, there were models that estimated only the degree of 
oligopsony, such as Murray (1995), Bergman & Brӓunland (1995), and Ronnila & 
Toppinen (2000). In these models, an inverse input supply function was used to 
replace the inverse product demand function in the simultaneous equation system 
developed by Appelbaum (1982). These models were set in the oligopsonistic 
industrial structure of the forest product processing industry. 
One key constraint of most empirical models of the degree of 
oligopoly/oligopsony is that they have been constructed by considering only the 
short-term optimal behavior of firms in the oligopolistic/oligopsonistic market 
using time-series data. Several researchers have sought to improve upon this from a 
dynamic point of view. For example, regarding the issue of time-series data, 
Aiginger, Brandner, & Wüger (1995) focused on the non-stationarity of time-series 
data, specifying simultaneous equations to remove the effects of autocorrelation. 
To consider a long-term equilibrium condition, Bernstein (1992) simultaneously 
examined the degree of monopoly and monopsony but focused on not only the 
static equilibrium but also the long-term equilibrium condition. Such a long-term 
perspective is key, because real joint-stock corporations usually aim to maximize 
capital investment across every accounting period rather than seek short-term profit 
maximization, as in the static analysis of economic theory. Although pioneering, 
the complicated equilibrium conditions in Bernstein (1992) included some omitted 
forms of capital adjustment costs, which were proportional to the square of the 
change in capital stock. Both approaches tried to smooth out changes in the degree 
of monopoly over time. In the dynamic real-world activities of corporations, 
however, the degree of monopoly/monopsony itself may fluctuate over time. Thus, 
an approach that can capture these dynamic movements would be more desirable. 
One more issue is data limitations that pose an essential problem for estimating 
the degree of monopoly and that have constrained empirical modelling. The 
estimation requires quantity and price data for both products and production inputs; 
it is difficult to gather such data for individual companies as a time series, because 
revenue and cost items in corporate financial statements typically include only the 
total amount-that is, prices multiplied by quantities. Appelbaum (1982) assumed a 
form for individual firms’ cost functions that made it possible to aggregate the cost 
functions over firms; then, she estimated the degree of oligopoly at the industry 
level. Most subsequent studies have followed this technique. Furthermore, even at 
an industry level, it is difficult to obtain quantity data for labor and energy inputs, 
which are used widely in many kinds of industries and production processes. Muth 
& Wohlgenant (1999) developed a model for estimating the degree of oligopoly 
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that did not require quantity data for labor or energy inputs and required only price 
data. However, generally, in most empirical studies in the field, proxy variables are 
used. 
In this study, the above two points are managed as follows. Dynamic modelling 
is necessary for tracking fluctuations in the degree of oligopoly/oligopsony. As 
such, this study follows Bernstein’s dynamic equilibrium method, which 
maximizes the sum of the discounted present value of profits at discrete times. If 
we solved an equation of the long-term optimizing condition using linear algebra, 
not regression, we would have the degree of monopoly and monopsony in each 
period. When we seek to obtain three degrees of monopoly and monopsony, and 
scale variables, solving the equation requires data for just five terms. If we change 
the time-series data by one term and repeatedly calculate the degree of 
monopoly/monopsony, we can monitor any trends. To escape solving quadratic 
equations and having imaginary number solutions, this study will suggest a simple 
solving method using linear equations to secure real number solutions. 
This empirical application is based on data from the financial statements of 
individual companies. The equation for the dynamic maximization of profits based 
on Cobb–Douglas production technology includes only total amount variables, so 
price and quantity data for the product and the inputs are not necessary. This 
method can be used to analyze either an individual firm or an industrial sector, with 
no concerns regarding data availability in the former case. 
 
3. Model 
3.1. Short-Term Equilibrium Condition 
This study begins by considering a case in which producers simultaneously face 
monopolistic product markets and monopsonistic ones. They maximize short-term 
profits and have a long-term equilibrium. The following analysis lays out the 
conditions for these two kinds of optimization.  
First, the short-term optimizing conditions will be considered. Assume a 
producer uses a general Cobb–Douglas production technology to produce one 
product using four production factors: capital, labor, material inputs, and other 
input factors (e.g., transportation and energy costs). This function is denoted by 
 
𝑦 = 𝛼5𝑣1
𝛼1𝑣2
𝛼2𝑣3
𝛼3𝐾𝛼4                                               (5) 
 
where y is the output quantity, 𝑣1 is the quantity of labor input, 𝑣2 is the quantity of 
material inputs, 𝑣3 is the quantity of other inputs, and K is the quantity of capital. 
In the short-term equilibrium, K is a given value, and 𝛼1+ 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 < 1, which 
secures convexity of the marginal costs function. 
As the producer simultaneously faces monopolistic product markets and 
monopsonistic ones, the short-run profit maximization problem is given by 
 
max 𝜋𝑚 = 𝑝 𝑦 ∙ 𝑦 − 𝑤1 𝑣1 ∙ 𝑣1 −𝑤2 𝑣2 ∙ 𝑣2−𝑤3 𝑣3 ∙ 𝑣3 − 𝑟𝐾 s.t.  (6) 
 
The optimal conditions come from differentiating the Lagrange equation by the 
variable factors 𝑣1 , 𝑣2 , and 𝑣3. These are given as 
 
 𝑝′ 𝑦 ∙ 𝑦 + 𝑝 𝑦  ∙ 𝑓𝑣𝑖
′ =  𝑤𝑖
′ 𝑣𝑖 ∙ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖(𝑣𝑖) ,       i =1, 2, 3.        (6) 
 
where 𝑝′ 𝑦 ∙ 𝑦 + 𝑝 𝑦   indicates the marginal revenue, which can also be 
expressed as (1+γ)∙p(y), where γ is the inverse demand elasticity. We now 
introduce the popular assumption that γ is constant-that is, it does not depend on 
the value of y. 𝑝𝑚 (y) can be defined by 
 
𝑝𝑚 (y)=  𝑝
′ 𝑦 ∙ 𝑦 + 𝑝 𝑦  =(1+γ)∙p(y)                                (7) 
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 𝑤𝑖
′ 𝑣𝑖 ∙ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖(𝑣𝑖)  in turn indicates the marginal factor costs, which can be 
expressed as (1+𝜎𝑖) ∙ 𝑤𝑖 , where 𝜎𝑖  is the inverse factor supply elasticity and is now 
supposed to be constant regardless of the value of 𝑣𝑖 . In the same way, 𝑤𝑖𝑚 (𝑣𝑖) 
can be defined by 
 
𝑤𝑖𝑚 (𝑣𝑖) =  𝑤𝑖
′ 𝑣𝑖 ∙ 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖(𝑣𝑖) = (1 + 𝜎𝑖) ∙ 𝑤𝑖(𝑣𝑖),    i =1, 2, 3  (8) 
 
The short-run optimization conditions in the monopoly and monopsony markets 
can be expressed by arranging eqs. (6), (7), and (8) as follows. 
 
y =
𝛼5 ∙  
𝑤1𝑚
1−𝛼2−𝛼3 ∙𝑤2𝑚
𝛼2 ∙𝑤3𝑚
𝛼3
𝛼5∙𝛼11−𝛼2−𝛼3 ∙𝛼2𝛼2 ∙𝛼3𝛼3 ∙𝑝𝑚𝐾𝛼4
 
𝛼1
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
∙
 
𝑤1𝑚
𝛼1 ∙𝑤2𝑚
1−𝛼1−𝛼3 ∙𝑤3𝑚
𝛼3
𝛼5∙𝛼11 ∙𝛼21−𝛼1−𝛼3 ∙𝛼3𝛼3 ∙𝑝𝑚𝐾𝛼4
 
𝛼2
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
∙  
𝑤1𝑚
𝛼1 ∙𝑤2𝑚
𝛼2 ∙𝑤3𝑚
1−𝛼1−𝛼2
𝛼5∙𝛼11 ∙𝛼2𝛼2 ∙𝛼31−𝛼1−𝛼2 ∙𝑝𝑚𝐾𝛼4
 
𝛼3
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
∙
𝐾𝛼4    (9) 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝛼5 ∙  
𝑤𝑖𝑚
  1−𝛼𝑗 −𝛼𝑘
∙𝑤𝑗𝑚
𝛼𝑗
∙𝑤𝑘𝑚
𝛼𝑘
𝛼5∙𝛼𝑖
1−𝛼𝑗 −𝛼𝑘
∙𝛼𝑗 𝛼𝑗 ∙𝛼𝑘 𝛼𝑘 ∙𝑝𝑚𝐾𝛼4
 
1
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
, 
 i, j, k=1,2,3 (i≠ j ≠ k)              (10) 
 
It is important to note that these equations are not normal supply and factor 
demand functions: 𝑝𝑚 (y) and 𝑤𝑖𝑚  𝑣𝑖  are endogenous variables and differ 
fromexogenous prices of a product and factors. The variable p depends on y 
through an inverse product demand function, and 𝑤𝑖  depends on 𝑣𝑖  (i =1, 2, 3) 
through inverse supply functions of production factors. Both y in the supply 
equation and 𝑣𝑖  in the factor demand equations also depend on 𝑝𝑚 (y) and 𝑤𝑖𝑚 (𝑣𝑖), 
respectively, considering (9) and (10). This interdependence makes it difficult to 
find an optimal point and to formulate an empirical model. 
To facilitate these calculations, we can utilize the relationship between 
imperfect competition models and perfect competition models. Now𝑦𝑡∗ indicates 
the short-term optimum production level, and 𝑝𝑡∗ is the equilibrium price in this 
imperfect competition model, as described in Graph1. A superscript t indicates a 
value in the t period. 
 
Graph 1. Imperfect Competition and perfect Competition in the Products 
 
Under the same production technology and the same given value of 𝐾𝑡 , 
𝑝𝑡∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡  is defined as a given market price with constant 𝑝𝑡∗and 𝛾𝑡  in a perfect 
competition. Subsequently, theybring the same production level 𝑦𝑡∗as the short-
term competitive equilibrium value. Further, 𝛾𝑡  is just the degree of monopoly in 
this imperfect competition model in the optimal point. 
We can consider the production factor markets in the same manner. In this 
model, the producer is a monopsonist in the factor markets. Further, 𝑣1
𝑡∗, 𝑣2
𝑡∗, 𝑣3
𝑡∗ 
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are the short-term optimal factor quantities, and 𝑤1
𝑡∗,𝑤2
𝑡∗,𝑤3
𝑡∗ are the equilibrium 
prices in this monopsonic equilibrium, as described in Graph 2. 
 
 
Graph 2. Imperfect Competition and perfect Competition in the Factor Market 
 
Under the same production technology and the same given value of 𝐾𝑡 , 
𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡  are defined as the market price with 
constant 𝑤1
𝑡∗,𝑤2
𝑡∗,𝑤3
𝑡∗,𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎3
𝑡 , which bring the short-term equilibrium 
factor quantities 𝑣1
𝑡∗,𝑣2
𝑡∗, 𝑣3
𝑡∗ in a perfect competition. We can then get the mark-up 
rates of 𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝜎3
𝑡 , which satisfy the condition where 𝑤1
𝑡∗𝑣1
𝑡∗,𝑤2
𝑡∗𝑣2
𝑡∗,  𝑤3
𝑡∗𝑣3
𝑡∗ are 
the costs for each realized by profit maximization in the imperfect competition in 
the t period. 
Therefore, in consideration of the long-term equilibrium conditions, the supply 
equation (9) and factor demand equations (10) can be regarded as supply function 
and factor demand functions under the given Kt,𝑝𝑡∗(1 + 𝛾𝑡) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎𝑖
𝑡 , 
which satisfy the short-term equilibrium conditions in the perfect competitive 
model. 
 
3.2. Long-Term Equilibrium Condition 
Long-term equilibrium conditions are derived from the problem of maximizing 
the time-series total of the discounted present value of profits defined by the short-
term pseudo-competitive equilibrium model minus capital costs. By solving these 
long-term pseudo-competitive profit maximization conditions, we can find 
optimal𝛾𝑡 ,𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎3
𝑡  that make the time series data of Kt, 
𝑝𝑡∗𝑦𝑡∗,𝑤1
𝑡∗𝑣1
𝑡∗,𝑤2
𝑡∗𝑣2
𝑡∗,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤3
𝑡∗𝑣3
𝑡∗ for each four periods the optimal dynamic 
solution.These past data can then be regarded as results that have satisfied both the 
short-term and long-term equilibrium conditions. At the same time, we can get the 
rent ratio, 𝛾𝑡  and 𝜎𝑖
𝑡 , which are the proportion of rent to a product price and factor 
prices. 
Now, let us formulate the long-term pseudo-competitive profit maximization. It 
is maximized for discrete time periods from 1 to T. The pseudo-competitive profit 
function in period t is defined as follows. 
 
𝜋𝑡 =  p𝑡∗(1 + 𝛾𝑡 )∙ 𝑦𝑡 𝑝𝑡∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡 ,𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡  
− 𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ∙ 𝑣1
𝑡 𝑝𝑡∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡 ,𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡  
− 𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ∙ 𝑣2
𝑡 𝑝𝑡∗(1 + 𝛾𝑡),𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡  
−𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ∙ 𝑣3
𝑡 𝑝𝑡∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡 ,𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡  
           −𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑡(𝐾𝑡−1 ,𝐾𝑡 ,𝛿𝑡)                  (11) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑡 ∙  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑖
𝑡 ∙   are eqs. (9) and (10), and 𝛾𝑡 ,𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎3
𝑡  are 
assumed to change over time. Investment in period t, 𝐼𝑡 𝐾𝑡−1 ,𝐾𝑡 ,𝛿𝑡  is defined as 
follows. 
𝐼𝑡(𝐾𝑡−1,𝐾𝑡 ,𝛿𝑡) = 𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿𝑡) ∙ 𝐾𝑡−1                                     (12)   
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where 𝛿𝑡  is the depreciation rate in period t, and 𝑄𝑡  is the exogenous unit price of 
investment in period t. 
The long-term equilibrium condition arises from maximizing the sum of the 
discounted present value of 𝜋𝑡  from period 1 to T  based on 𝐾𝑡 , as follows. 
 
 max
𝐾𝑡
𝛱 = 𝜋1 𝑝1∗ 1 + 𝛾1 ,𝑤1
1∗ 1 + 𝜎1
1 ,𝑤2
1∗ 1 + 𝜎2
1 ,𝑤3
1∗ 1 + 𝜎3
1 ,𝐾1 ,𝐾0 , 𝛿1 
+   
1
 1 + 𝑟𝑠 
𝑡
𝑠=2
𝜋𝑡{𝑝𝑡∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡 ,𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1
𝑇
𝑡=2
+ 𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡−1 ,𝛿𝑡} 
=⋯⋯+  
1
 1+𝑟𝑠 
{𝑝𝑡∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡 ∙ 𝑦𝑡 ∙ − 𝑤1
𝑡∗(1 + 𝜎1
𝑡) ∙ 𝑣1
𝑡𝑡
𝑠=2  ∙ − 𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ∙
                       𝑣2
𝑡 ∙ − 𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ∙ 𝑣3
𝑡 ∙ − 𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑡(𝐾𝑡−1 ,𝐾𝑡 ,𝛿𝑡)} 
+ 
1
 1+𝑟𝑠 
{𝑝𝑡+1∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡+1 ∙ 𝑦𝑡+1 ∙ − 𝑤1
𝑡+1∗(1 + 𝜎1
𝑡+1) ∙ 𝑣1
𝑡+1(∙)𝑡+1𝑠=2  
−𝑤2
𝑡+1∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡+1 ∙ 𝑣2
𝑡+1 ∙ − 𝑤3
𝑡+1∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡+1 ∙ 𝑣3
𝑡+1 ∙  
−𝑄𝑡+1 ∙ 𝐼𝑡+1(𝐾𝑡 ,𝐾𝑡+1 ,𝛿𝑡+1)} + ⋯⋯                                  (13) 
 
Thus, the necessary condition for optimization is given as follows:2 
 
𝜕Π
𝜕𝐾𝑡 =  
1
 1 + 𝑟𝑠 
∙ [
𝑡
𝑠=2
p𝑡∗ 1 + 𝛾𝑡 ∙
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
−𝑤1
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ∙
𝜕𝑣1
𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
−𝑤2
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 
∙
𝜕𝑣2
𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
 
−𝑤3
𝑡∗ 1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ∙
𝜕𝑣3
𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
− 𝑄𝑡 ∙
𝜕𝐼𝑡
𝜕𝐾𝑡
] +  
1
 1+𝑟𝑠 
𝑡+1
𝑠=2 [−𝑄
𝑡+1 ∙
𝜕𝐼𝑡+1
𝜕𝐾𝑡
] = 0                 (14) 
 
Generally, partial differentiations can be developed as follows: 
 
𝜕𝐵
𝜕𝐴
 = 
𝜕𝐵
𝜕 ln 𝐵
∙  
𝜕 ln 𝐵
𝜕 ln 𝐴
∙
𝜕 ln 𝐴
𝜕𝐴
                                                    (15) 
 
Referring to the short-term optimizing conditions, eqs. (9) and (10): 
 
𝜕 ln 𝑦
𝜕 ln 𝐾
=  
−𝛼1𝛼4
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
+  
−𝛼2𝛼4
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
+ 
−𝛼3𝛼4
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
+  𝛼4= 
−𝛼4
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
             (16) 
𝜕 ln 𝑣𝑖
𝜕 ln 𝐾
=   
−𝛼4
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
 ,  i = 1, 2, 3                                             (17)   
 
Using 𝜕 ln𝑥 𝜕𝑥 = 1 𝑥  and eqs. (15) to (17) yields 
 
𝜕𝑦
𝜕𝐾
 = 
−𝛼4
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
∙
𝑦
𝐾
                        (18)  
𝜕𝑣𝑖
𝜕𝐾
 = 
−𝛼4
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
∙
𝑣𝑖
𝐾
,         i = 1, 2, 3                                   (19)  
 
From eq. (12), 𝜕𝐼𝑡 𝜕𝐾𝑡 = 1, 𝜕𝐼𝑡+1 𝜕𝐾𝑡 =−(1 − 𝛿𝑡+1). Arranging (14) and 
using eqs. (18) to (19), we obtain the long-term equilibrium condition as follows. 
 
𝜕Π
𝜕𝐾𝑡
=  
1
 1 + 𝑟𝑠 
∙ [
𝑡
𝑠=2
−𝛼4
𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 − 1
∙  1 + 𝛾𝑡 ∙
𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐾𝑡
−
−𝛼4
𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 − 1
∙  1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ∙
𝑤1
𝑡𝑣1
𝑡
𝐾𝑡
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−
−𝛼4
𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 − 1
∙  1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ∙
𝑤2
𝑡𝑣2
𝑡
𝐾𝑡
−
−𝛼4
𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 − 1
∙  1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ∙
𝑤3
𝑡𝑣3
𝑡
𝐾𝑡
− 𝑄𝑡] 
+ 
1
 1+𝑟𝑠 
𝑡+1
𝑠=2 ∙ 𝑄
𝑡+1 ∙ (1 − 𝛿𝑡+1) = 0                                       (20) 
 
Arranging this into a simple equation, 
 
 1 + 𝛾𝑡 ∙
𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑡
𝐾𝑡
−  1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 ∙
𝑤1
𝑡𝑣1
𝑡
𝐾𝑡
−  1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 ∙
𝑤2
𝑡𝑣2
𝑡
𝐾𝑡
−  1 + 𝜎3
𝑡 ∙
𝑤3
𝑡𝑣3
𝑡
𝐾𝑡
 
−  
𝛼1+𝛼2+𝛼3−1
−𝛼4
∙  𝑄𝑡 −
1
 1+𝑟𝑡+1 
∙ 𝑄𝑡+1 ∙  1 − 𝛿𝑡+1  = 0             (21)3 
 
3.3. Meaning of Rent 
Are the above-induced mark-up ratios 𝛾𝑡 ,𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎3
𝑡  only monopolistic 
rent? These ratios should be regarded to include many kinds of rents: rent based on 
transfers, Schumpeterian rent, natural resource rent, and monitoring and 
management rent.2 Subsidies, a kind of transfer rent, are generally items of non-
operating income, which consist of py, and seem to enhance 𝑝𝑡∗and (absolute value 
of) 𝛾𝑡 . Schumpeterian rent is an achievement where investment ahead of other 
companies improves production technology, which also enhances𝑝𝑡∗and (absolute 
value of) 𝛾𝑡 . Monitoring and management rent are also reflected in 𝑝𝑡∗and 𝛾𝑡 . If 
natural resource rents are not internalized, the resource procurement costs of 
manufacturing companies, 𝑤2
𝑡∗ are kept low, and 𝜎2
𝑡  seems to increase. 
Thus, various kinds of rents are included in mark-up ratios 𝛾𝑡 ,𝜎1
𝑡 ,𝜎2
𝑡 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎3
𝑡 . It 
can be said that the following calculation is not only for monopoly rent but also for 
the sum of various rents. 
 
4. Application: Estimating the Parameters and Rent for 
Industrial Sectors in Japan 
4.1. Calculation Method 
This section uses the theoretical model developed in Section 3, specifically the 
long-term equilibrium condition, eq. (21), to specify the mark-up rates,γ and 𝜎𝑖 , in 
an applied case study of Japanese industrial sectors. The estimation is done not by 
using econometric methods but rather by solving a system of equations.  
When firm-level financial data are available for at least four years, it is possible 
to obtain four equations by creating each equation using a given year’s financial 
data, if the value of the scale parameter 𝑅𝑡(= 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 − 1 −𝛼4 )
4 is given. 
However, if scale parameter R is not given, we suppose that 𝜎3 is zero.
5The 
unknown variables are γ, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, and 𝑅
𝑡 , and the number of equations is also four. 
If the inverse matrix of the coefficient matrix exists, it would be possible to obtain 
a solution for γ, 𝜎1, 𝜎2 , and 𝑅
𝑡 .  
The system of equations was solved using MATLAB software (MATLAB ver. 
R2016a),6 which supports the manipulation of symbolic and numerical expressions. 
Using matrix expressions, simultaneous equations for γ, 𝜎1, 𝜎2 , and𝑅
𝑡in eq. (21) 
can be set for the four years of financial data as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑉3
𝑡 
𝑉3
𝑡+1
𝑉3
𝑡+2
𝑉3
𝑡+3 
 
 
 
 
 
=
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑌
𝑡 −𝑉1
𝑡 −𝑉2
𝑡 −𝑄𝑡 
𝑌𝑡+1 −𝑉1
𝑡+1 −𝑉2
𝑡+1 −𝑄𝑡+1 
𝑌𝑡+2
𝑌𝑡+3
−𝑉1
𝑡+2 
−𝑉1
𝑡+3 
−𝑉2
𝑡+2 −𝑄𝑡+2 
−𝑉2
𝑡+3 −𝑄𝑡+3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 + 𝛾𝑡 
 1 + 𝜎1
𝑡 
 1 + 𝜎2
𝑡 
𝑅𝑡  
 
 
 
                           (22)  
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where 𝑄𝑡 ≡ 𝑄𝑡 −
1
1+𝑟𝑡+1
∙ 𝑄𝑡+1 ∙  1 − 𝛿𝑡+1 , 𝑌𝑡 ≡
𝑝𝑡𝑦 𝑡
𝐾𝑡
,𝑉𝑖
𝑡 ≡
𝑤𝑖
𝑡𝑣𝑖
𝑡
𝐾𝑡
. 𝛾𝑡 , and 𝜎𝑖
𝑡  
(i=1,2) are the mark-up rates in an output and inputs in periods t to t+3. If the 
coefficient matrix has an inverse matrix,  
By calculation of these equations, we obtain γ, 𝜎1, 𝜎2, and 𝑅
𝑡 . Using financial 
data covering 30 years, it is possible to set t from the first year to the 27th year. For 
each t, the solutions of γ, 𝜎1, 𝜎2 ,and𝑅
𝑡  are given; however, the equation for period t 
contains the discount rate of the t+1 period, 𝑟𝑡+1, and so the number of solutions is 
26. Thus, the following subsection calculates and presents the average values of 
rents, which are calculated by −𝛾𝑡𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑡 +  𝜎1𝑤1
𝑡𝑣1
𝑡 + 𝜎2𝑤2
𝑡𝑣2
𝑡and the average rent 
rates (rent/py) across 26 years for each industry.  
 
4.2. Data 
Based on information from Teikoku Data Bank (2017), 29 major industrial 
sectors in Japan were selected for the analysis. Subsequently, approximately 25of 
the largest sales companies in each industrial sector were selected based on fiscal 
year 2015 sales rankings, as listed in Teikoku Data Bank (2017; as far as financial 
statements exist in the database). Financial data for these companies were 
downloaded from Nikkei NEEDS Financial QUEST 2.0., which is a database of 
financial statements. The contents of the costs of banks, stock brokerage firms, and 
insurance companies differ from other industries for the case of single account 
closing in a database; thus, the industrial sector was reduced to 26 sectors. The data 
cover the most recent 30 years. Many companies have data covering the full period 
of 1984–2017, but in some cases, the data period is shorter, or the data are from an 
earlier period. The total number of companies is 392.  
Data on discount rates come in the form of nationwide average loan rates for 
each year, as provided by the Bank of Japan (1970–2013). The unit price of 
investment (Q) was set as one every year. 
 
5. Results 
The rent calculations are carried out both for the non-consolidated account 
closing and for the consolidated account closing. We examined one proposition 
before we focused on comparing rent among industrial sectors. For the data of non-
consolidated closing, the sales amount and operating revenues (py), labor costs 
(w1v1), material costs (w2v2), other costs (w3v3), and total assets (K) are 
available. For consolidated closing, specifications of production costsare not 
available in Japan.7 It is also difficult to find a breakdown of expensesfor European 
and American global companies. 
Therefore, three pseudo-production factors were set: (1) operating expenses 
(w1v1), (2) non-operating expenses and extraordinary losses (w2v2), and (3) 
income taxes (w3v3). It was examined whether the calculation of rent by these 
pseudo-production factors can substitute rent calculation for real production 
factors. For convenience, calculation by normal production factors is method 1, and 
that by pseudo-production factors is method 2. 
The above hypothesis is tested by correlation coefficients between method 1 
and method 2 for each industrial sector using the data of non-consolidated closing. 
Table 1 shows the results of the weighted average of correlation coefficients 
weighted by the number of time-series samples of each company in each industry. 
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Table 1. Weighted Average of Correlation Coefficient Between Methods 1 and 2 in Each 
Industry 
    Weighted Average of Correlation 
Coefficient in Each Industry 
Amount of Sample 
Companies 
Total Time 
Series Samples 
1 Mining 0.93 3 78 
2 Agriculture 0.89 2 46 
3 Construction  0 0 
4 Food and Beverage 0.87 4 88 
5 Textiles 0.88 4 73 
6 Wood and Furniture 0.8 3 70 
7 Paper and pulp 0.95 4 96 
8 Printing 0.85 5 84 
9 Chemical 0.97 5 128 
10 Rubber and Leather 0.96 3 75 
11 Ceramics and Cement 0.95 3 78 
12 Steel 0.92 2 52 
13 Non-ferrous Metals 0.92 2 35 
14 Machinery 0.99 1 26 
15 Cars and Parts 0.94 6 156 
16 Electrical Machinery 0.91 2 51 
17 Wholesale 0.98 1 26 
18 Department Store 0.84 1 26 
19 Retailer 0.94 11 235 
23 Real Estate 1 1 15 
24 Transportation 1 1 4 
25 Telecommunication  0 0 
26 Electricity, Gas, and Water 0.91 6 139 
27 Newspapers and Publishers  0.97 2 30 
28 Advertising 0.98 1 26 
29 Information 0.96 2 27 
  Weighted Average of All 0.92   
Total 75 1664 
 
Among 75 companies,8 the null hypotheses of the t test were not rejected for 
data of only one company at 2.5 percent significance level on one side; however, 
the hypotheses were also rejected at 5 percent significance level. For the total 1664 
samples, the correlation coefficient of the rent amount was 0.987; the average rent 
amount by method 1 was 6628.6 mil yen, and that by method 2 was 6657.5 mil 
yen. This means that the error between them was 0.43 percent.Thus, method 2 can 
be used as the proxy of method 1 depending on analytic purposes. The following 
will show the results of the rent calculations, which were carried out for both the 
non-consolidated account closing and the consolidated account closing. 
 
 
TABLE 2: Result of Calculation/Rent Amount and Rent Rate of Each Industry
Rent / Sales Rent Rent/ Sales
(%) (mil yen) (%)
1 Mining 8 6716.5 0.072 9 1 6 32171.8 0.058 1 3
2 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery 4 996.5 0.025 6 3 1340.1 0.024 6
3 Construction 14 6111.2 0.011 19 8041.3 0.01
4 Food and Beverage 14 3447 0.01 18 8860 0.014
5 Textiles 15 541.4 0.01 15 1456.2 0.011
6 Wood and Furniture 15 1016.6 0.019 15 1569.6 0.016
7 Paper and pulp 16 1385.7 0.019 11 3390.1 0.013
8 Printing 15 3696 0.018 14 4133.1 0.018
9 Chemicals 17 14887.3 0.048 6 3 20 29495.9 0.034 3 6
10 Rubber and Leather 16 3033.7 0.016 16 7010.1 0.021
11 Ceramics and Cement 17 2291 0.014 14 5508 0.02
12 Steel 16 6704.7 0.017 10 18 9103.1 0.017
13 Non-ferrous Metals 18 3700.3 0.019 15 13985.2 0.018
14 Machinery 20 13197.5 0.022 8 10 16 25871.5 0.022 10
15 Cars and Parts 22 23174.5 0.012 3 17 84840.8 0.018
16 Electrical Machinery 18 15418.1 0.022 5 9 17 36997.1 0.028 9 8
17 Wholesale 18 14400.8 0.006 7 17 20957.6 0.005
18 Department Store 15 641.2 0.004 11 3730.5 0.006
19 Retail 18 5791.8 0.024 7 13 10241.1 0.029 7 7
20 Bank 16 38393.1 0.057 4
21 Stock Brokerage Firm 3 16595 0.089 2
22 Insurance Company 7 34296.1 0.018
23 Real Estate 17 4415 0.024 8 17 8569 0.037 8 5
24 Transportation 18 15824.3 0.018 4 15 24627.4 0.022
25 Telecommunications 13 62667.8 0.067 1 2 7 110524 0.11 2 1
26 Electricity, Gas, and Water 17 25198.1 0.025 2 5 18 23561.6 0.023 5
27 Newspapers and Publishers 6 1216.3 0.006 7 3575.9 0.013
28 Advertising 8 1632.7 0.008 9 2965.8 0.024 10
29 Information 17 4374.1 0.03 4 16 9399.1 0.025 4 9
Non-Consolidated Account Closing Consolidated Account Closing
Sample
Rent (mil
yen)
Ranking of
Rent
Ranking of
Rent/ Sales
Sample
Ranking of
Rent
Ranking of
Rent/ Sales
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The industries whose rent amount or rent rate was ranked from 1st place to 3rd 
place were telecommunications, mining, electricity, gas and water, chemicals, cars 
and pars, and stock brokerage firms. This means that these industries earned a lot 
of rent for the past 30 years.  
 
6. The Relationship Between Political Expenditure and/or 
R&D and Rent 
Now, using the calculated rent, let us examine through an empirical study 
whether rent induces political expenditure of corporates, as Bhagwati (1982) 
pointed out, even though rent is probably the result of corporates’ political 
behavior, such as lobbying. At the same time, rent may induce innovation through 
R&D investment, or R&D expenditure may cause Schumpeter rent. Although it is 
difficult to clarify the cause-and-effect relations, we can clarify the significant 
correlation between political or R&D expenditure and rent. 
 
6.1. Data 
Two kinds of data were available about the political expenditure of companies. 
One was the expenditure for political donation, lobbying activities, etc., from 2008 
to 2015, which Toyokeizai Shinposha researched using a questionnaire survey 
(political expenditure 1). The other included data from the political funds balance 
report of corporate donations to Kokumin Seiji Kyokai, a political fund 
organization of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for 2015 (political expenditure 
2). This is because most corporate donations in Japan are for the LDP.  
The R&D expenditure data of those companies consist of development and 
testing research expenses from Nikkei NEEDS Financial QUEST. 
 
6.2. Method 
First, the calculated and average rent amounts or rent ratesin all periods and in 
each industry were regressed by political expenditure and/or R&D expenditure, 
which were also averaged among all periods of each company and within each 
industry by ordinary least squares regression. The number of samples was 
dependent on the available industry sectors, so there were 26 for non-consolidated 
settlement and 29 for consolidated settlement. Table 3 lists only the results in 
which at least one independent variable cleared the t test. 
 
 
 
Political expenditure 1 and R&D expenditure for each company are time series 
data. This means that we can also try a panel data analysis. Rent amounts with 
attributes of each company and each period are regressed by those data using panel 
methods with dummy variables of industry sectors. The number of samples was 68 
for simple settlement data and 275 for consolidated settlement data. Pooling 
regression (OLS), fixed-effects model, and GLS random-effects model were 
implemented. Table 4 also lists only the results in which at least one independent 
variable cleared the t test. 
 
TABLE 3: Regression of Political and R&D Expenditures for Rent (Cross-Section)
Consolidated or
Non-consolidated
Non-Consolidated P1 RA P1 1039.5 2.48 0.02 0.171
Consolidated P1 RA P1 1285.1 2.14 0.042 0.113
Consolidated P2, R RR P2 0.00133 2.33 0.028 0.11
Consolidated P2 RR P2 0.00128 2.34 0.027 0.138
Adj R-
squared
Notes.  Dependent Variable :Political Expenditure 1 = P1, Political Expenditure 2 = P2, R&D Expenditure = R
Dependent
Variable
Rent Amount
(RA) or Rent
Rate (RR)
Significant
Coefficient
Coefficient t-statistic Prob>|t|
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6.3. Results 
Interesting findings were obtained from the above analyses. Generally, political 
expenditure has a significant correlation with rent, even though the coefficients of 
determination are nothigh. Furthermore, the parameter estimates of political 
expenditure are between 1039.5 and 2013.3,except for 8272.8 by the pooled OLS. 
This means that 1million yen of political expenditure will induce 1 or 2 billion yen 
of rent or will be provided as the result of it. The rent rate will be raised 0.1 percent 
by 1 million yen of political expenditure. 
R&D expenditure never cleared the t test in all regressions. It is unfortunate for 
Japanese industries that in 30 years, R&D investment has not securedexcessive 
profits, even though this might be because of data quality. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This study developed a new approach that could become a standard method for 
calculating the comprehensive rent of each company from financial data. 
Regarding the methodological aspect, the degree of monopoly in the monopoly 
model was shown to be equal to the mark-up rate that could realize the production 
level in monopolistic equilibrium as a competitive equilibrium based on past time-
series financial data. One of the advantages of using financial statements is that the 
rent calculated from the mark-up rate includes not only monopolistic rents but also 
a comprehensive rent total, including various other rents. By this calculation 
method, even if there was no breakdown of expenses in calculating corporate rents 
from financial data, approximate values could be obtained using pseudo-production 
factors such as operating expenses, non-operating expenses and extraordinary 
losses, and corporate taxes. 
Based on the financial data of major Japanese industries (single and 
consolidated settlements) over the past 30 years, the average value and rent rate of 
large enterprises in 29 industrial sectors (26 single settlement industries) were 
calculated. As a result, industries that ranked third in terms of rents or rent rates in 
single or consolidated accounts were telecommunications, mining, electricity, gas 
and water, chemicals, cars and parts, and insurance companies. 
Remarkably, based on Japan’s regressions over the past 30 years, R&D 
expenditure did not show any significant correlation with rent amount and rent rate. 
On the other hand, in several models, political expenditure showed a significant 
correlation with rent both for single and consolidated settlements, even though the 
coefficients of determination were low. It was estimated that1 million yen of 
political expenditure was the cause or the result of 1 or 2-billion-yen rent. 
Based on the above analysis, if rent was the result of political expenditure, 
entrepreneurs would find it far more profitable to invest in political processes than 
to aim for the market. It is suggested that political expenditure should be added to 
economic variables. Although this study conducted analyses using a simple 
regression model without a time lag from the limited data of the time series in 
political expenditure,9 in the future, it is hoped that a more detailed empirical 
TABLE 4: Regression of Political and R&D Expenditures for Rent (Panel Data)
Consolidated or
Non-Consolidated
Dependent
Variable a)
Model b)
Significant
Coefficient
Coefficient t-statistic Prob>|t| R-squared
Consolidated P1 OLS P1 8272.8 7.69 0 0.177 c)
Non-Consolidated P1, R Fixed P1 1772.7 2.42 0.019 0.261 d)
Non-Consolidated P1, R Random P1 1819.9 2.55 0.011 0.2606 d)
Non-Consolidated P1 Fixed P1 1971.1 2.91 0.005 0.2531 d)
Non-Consolidated P1 Random P1 2013.3 3.05 0.002 0.2531 d)
Notes . a) Political Expenditure 1 = P1, R&D Expenditure = R; b) OLS = Pooling Regression, Fixed = Fixed-Effects
Model, Random = GLS Random-Effects Model; c) Adjusted R-Squared; d) within
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analysis will be conducted to examine the relationship between political 
expenditure and rent. 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number16K00685. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1
 Furthermore, as we will explain later, all kinds of rent that a company can get seem to be 
comprehensively captured by the monopoly and monopsony rent measuring method in this study. 
2 About the detailed explanation of these rents, see, for example, Khan & Sundaram (2000). 
3 In this empirical study, financial statements are used as data from each company. The depreciation 
amount for a year is included in the item of costs. Therefore, 𝛿𝑡+1 was set as zero, escaping from 
double count. 
4 Suppose that S = 𝛼1+𝛼2 + 𝛼3 + 𝛼4  ≥ 1, which means that in the long term, the return to scale is 
equal to, or more than, 1. As mentioned before,  
 
5 The production factor 𝑣3 is defined as other costs, excluding labor costs 𝑣1and material costs 𝑣2, as 
mentioned in detail later. Further, 𝑣3includes various factors; therefore, we cannot interpret their 
rent. 
6 These equations systems were solved by the command “lsqlin” in MATLAB, which is a solver of 
constrained linear least-squares problems. 
7 Additionally, for non-consolidated account closing, for enterprises that have disclosed the segment 
information, the publication of manufacturing cost specifications has been exempted since fiscal 
year 2014. 
8 During rent calculation, when a datum of a production factor input was 0 or blank, the value of it 
was set to 1, and 1 was suppressed from another production factor input. In obtaining the correlation 
coefficients data of companies, such treatments were excluded to escape estimation bias. 
9 In Japan, long time-series data of the political expenditure of corporates is not open. 
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